sehepunkte 26 (2026), Nr. 6

Simone Lombardo: I genovesi alla guerra d'Otranto (1480-1481)

Simone Lombardo's I genovesi alla guerra d'Otranto offers a history of Genoese perceptions, actions, and diplomacy during the events of 1480-1 as a probe through which to study the nature of Genoa's community, its diplomatic modus operandi, and its engagement with the east. The book offers rich insight into Italian politics and diplomacy at large while leaving to others matters of trade, military history, and Ottoman realities (save for brief, synthetic sections).

The introduction stresses the multiplicity of personal and familial interests that shaped the Genoese polity. Aligning with recent trends in diplomatic history, Lombardo seeks to account for the roles of various individuals of diverse backgrounds in shaping diplomatic outcomes. The introduction outlines two main goals for the book: establishing the relationship between crusade and diplomacy and understanding Genoa's stance on the east in the aftermath of the loss of Caffa and the Crimea. Indeed, the book makes a case that Genoa's famed westwards turn was not a foregone conclusion until after the events at Otranto had played out.

Chapter 1 offers a synthesis of Genoa's losses in the east prior to the Ottoman expedition in Puglia in 1480. Lombardo reviews Genoese involvement in the events of 1453, which left Genoa without a clear strategy going forward (or even a reliable approach to the Ottoman court) as well as the prevarications of Genoese Lesbos (whose rulers were fully integrated into both the Latin and Byzantine worlds) and the varied trajectories of prominent Genoese individuals (the last Gattilusio's behavior likely provoked Mehmed's conquest of Lesbos, while others cooperated with the sultan). The chapter then discusses the loss of Genoa's Black Sea colonies: these were in full decline after 1453, yet the Genoese took what defensive measures they could despite the logistical challenges posed by Ottoman control of the straits. Lombardo concludes with an overview of Chios, the last standing Genoese colony. Overall, Genoa proved unable to manage the Ottoman impact, while enterprising individuals found ways to prosper amid radical reconfigurations of politics and trade. This introductory chapter suggests that Genoa's inherently decentralized approach to trade and politics offered a higher ceiling - at the cost of a lower floor - relative to Venice's tightly controlled commercial and political enterprise.

Chapter 2 analyzes Genoa's interest in the crusade for the recovery of Otranto, exposing Genoese desires and the complex ways in which institutions and individuals alike shaped diplomatic outcomes. Lombardo reviews the Ottoman assault on Rhodes and critically assesses Italian interpretations of the Otranto campaign. While the book does not engage with Ottoman history, it shines in illuminating Italian politics, including Genoese-Milanese relations. Sixtus IV's actions, along with those of his warring nephew, unsettled Italy and undermined papal credibility on the eve of the crusade. The second section examines the Genoese archbishop and fleet admiral Paolo Fregoso and the enigmatic Ibleto Fieschi (who is properly introduced well after he first appears in the narrative), the constant internal political drama in Genoa, and Milan's involvement in its affairs. The chapter then briefly reviews events and naval preparations before arguing that Genoese receptivity to crusading discourse stemmed from their desire to recover lost colonies rather than from any particular concern for Otranto.

Chapter 3 studies diplomacy during the crusade of Otranto in the summer of 1481 and is perhaps the book's most impactful. Mehmed II's death excited the Genoese, lending credibility to their dreams of recovering lost eastern fortunes. After summarizing the development of large round ships and outlining the growth of Genoa's fleet, the chapter briefly engages the historiographical debate on Genoa's westward turn. Lombardo argues that as of 1481 Genoa was clearly at a crossroads, but that the choice of the west did not solidify until after the Otranto campaign had concluded without a Genoese seaborne force sailing into the Aegean.

As the book overall, the chapter focuses on reconstructing the political and diplomatic history of late fifteenth-century Italy. The Milanese feared a Venetian-Genoese alliance; the Genoese suspected a papal-Venetian one. In early July 1481, the Genoese envoy sought to convince the pope that the Genoese fleet should sail east rather than linger at Otranto. When the pope indirectly declined, the Genoese suspected the pope of planning to use the fleet for his Italian goals, the Venetians, of efforts to block papal authorization for the Genoese eastern campaign, and King Ferrante, of designs on former Genoese colonies, even Caffa. The chapter shows how the fight against the Turk took second place to Italian politics.

Instead of sailing east, the Genoese galleys were stuck at Otranto, where crews had to contend with a plague outbreak. During the siege, Genoese crossbowmen displayed impressive marksmanship, but their commanders clashed with their Neapolitan counterparts. After the Turks surrendered on 10 September 1481, plague and unpaid wages began to take their toll. The pope deeply resented the Genoese refusal to extend the crusade from Otranto to Valona while a Genoese commander articulated the crews' stance at a meeting in Rome in early October: the Genoese could not continue the crusade due to disease, lack of pay, unwillingness to serve King Ferrante again, the absence of booty at Otranto, and the impossibility of attacking Valona with winter approaching. This meeting effectively ended the crusade and the plans it had generated.

The fourth and final chapter reviews the crusade's impact on Genoa. The Genoese had sent a secret embassy to the Crimean Khanate, seeking to exploit internal divisions there while using the crusading effort propagandistically at home. They struggled with delayed and contradictory news. Cardinal-archbishop-admiral Fregoso, like everyone else, attempted to profit politically from the recovery of Otranto. Yet the widely celebrated return from Otranto in 1481 marked not a geopolitical success but the end of any realistic hope for recovering the Genoese east. Much of the chapter traces in detail the Genoese legacies in the east, showing that both their presence and their influence were on a downward trajectory thereafter. Slaves and exiles, meanwhile, proved the most consequential eastern influences on Genoa itself.

In conclusion, Lombardo argues that the east was not abandoned by the Genoese until after 1481, resists analytical distinctions between developments within and outside Genoa, stresses the political vitality of the Genoese as expressed through a plurality of voices and actions, and suggests that while Genoa ultimately profited from its westward turn, a marked nostalgia for the east remained.

I genovesi alla guerra d'Otranto advances our understanding of Genoese politics, diplomacy, and perceptions of the east in the aftermath of the loss of the Black Sea colonies, during the crusade of Otranto, and in its immediate aftermath. On a larger scale, it sheds further light on Italian politics and diplomacy in the last quarter of the Quattrocento. This book is a needed steppingstone toward holistic efforts to re-examine the causes and trajectory of Genoa's westward turn.